A Platonic Defense of Religion #1: Overview

Plato provides underdeveloped arguments for a religious worldview. I will not attempt to develop them any further here, but let's take a look at them anyway as a sort of "seed of truth" at the core of much more sophisticated arguments.

In this first post, this will be ridiculously brief.

1. The material world points beyond itself to an eternal and perfect source.
2. The human soul is immortal.
3. God, a rational soul that causes the motions and changes in the world, exists.

Next post we will look at the first idea.

The Unmoved Mover - QBASIC Style!

Run a simple QBASIC program. The output is "42."

Look at the last line of the program:

PRINT A

So clearly, the A variable has a value of 42. The next line up is:

LET A = B

So it's getting that value from the variable B. The next line is:

LET B = C

And so on. Eventually, the letters cycle around again and double:

LET Z = AA
LET AA = BB

And so on and so on.

Questions:

1. Is there a line of code somewhere in the program that assigns the number 42 to one of the variables?
2. Can Occam's Razor be used to conclude that there is probably no such line of code?
3. Does it make sense to ask what line of code assigns the value 42 to the number 42?

All questions refer to within the lines of code, not the programmer (otherwise you leap out of the thought exercise and into the argument proper).

Answering these questions will go a long way in understanding how the unmoved mover of Aristotle (which is also the First Way of Aquinas) is supposed to work, and will help in avoiding bad objections to it.

Answers:

1. Yes.
2. No.
3. No.

11 Responses to Fine-Tuning, from cosmologist Luke Barnes

This is a brief summary of the interview with cosmologist Luke Barnes, from  commonsenseatheism.com

1. Could the fine-tuning just be a coincidence?

It would be an amazing coincidence; maybe when all scientific knowledge is finished, we may want to consider that as a possibility.

2. We only have one universe to observe, so the chances of a finely tuned one is 1:1

Probabilities are about finding out what's probable from among what's possible. If Dawkins sees stars above his house written by God, and then says "Well there is only one universe, so the probability of those stars being arranged like that is 1:1.” Clearly, this is not a good answer.

3. Life can adapt to many different environments

If the fine tuning were off by just a bit, matter would collapsed into black holes, or the only stable element would be hydrogen, or the universe may have not expanded at all. There wouldn’t be molecules or even elements at all in the first place for life to be built from.

4. There could be other forms of life, based on silicon for example

Imagine a vast sheet of paper with a few pencil dots on it.The pencil dots represent life-permitting universes. If silicon can be stable enough to form life, then carbon can as well. And so having life based on other elements would be like putting a tiny pimple attached to some of the pencil dots.

5. Of course the universe is fine tuned, otherwise we wouldn't be here.

This is the anthropic principle. What if you asked why quasars are so bright, and someone answered “Well if they weren't so bright you would not be able to see them.” It explains why we don't see non-life-permitting universes, but doesn't explain why we do observe life-permitting ones. It's not the sort of explanation we are after; we need a causal explanation.

6. It's not possible for the universe to be any other way. Physical  necessity.

Other universes are logically possible. If the fine tuning is built into the theory of everything, then this just makes the problem worse because now the fine tuning is built into the very fabric of reality itself.

7. Perhaps there is a large number of universes

The multiverse is a good naturalistic option. But it’s not completely unproblematic. For one thing, the multiverse would have to be fined tuned as well; if you have a bad toaster, it will still spit out nothing but bad toast. Also, the probability of a finely-tuned universe even on the multiverse view is so great that we are more likely to be a Boltzmann Brain than a real universe.

8. Someone in the next universe up created this one

Then that universe would have to be fine tuned. It just moves the problem up a step.

9. Someone has to have a poker hand. Each is just as unlikely as any other.

Whenever I deal, I get a royal flush. Ten times in a row. Any set of ten poker hands is unlikely. Much of probability is about asking the right questions. "If this universe was chosen at random, then what is the probability of it supporting life?" is the wrong question.

The right question is "This universe is right for life; what is the probability that it was chosen at random?" So this objection fails.

10. The universe was not designed for life, but rather for vaccum or black holes

PZ myers asks why the entire universe couldn't just be lakefront property, but if it were, then it would collapse in on itself from gravity. The universe has to be big and sparse so that it expands and lasts a long time; any deviation from that and the universe would not exist at all.  This objection also misses the point.

Analogy: lets say we asked about all the possible ways that you could assemble two tons of metal and plastic. Of all the possible ways of arranging that metal and plastic, the set of functioning cars is very small. Could you refute that claim by saying "But your car doesn't go very fast!" Obviously not. It's a wrong-headed objection.

11. God

Isn't 100%, but it could be seen as making theism more palatable than naturalism.

What about God of the gaps?

God of the gaps applies to stuff in the universe, but fine tuning is about the stopping point. If naturalism is true, then this is just the way it is and you have to just take it as brute fact.

The designer is mysterious, so how does it explain anything?

Think of the cheating poker player. You would have to have some estimation of the prior probability that I would cheat. Even if we don't know you, we would still have to conclude that you ARE in fact cheating. Because even if you don't know me, it is up against the incontrovertible evidence that I am cheating.

Robert Maydole: Modal Perfection Argument

Possibility

1. If it’s not possible that a supreme being exists, then supreme beings must have the property of “not being supreme”

Support:: If no one can be supreme, then even supreme beings must have the property of not being supreme. Seems like an absurd proposition on the face of it (“if it is not possible that supreme beings exist, then supreme beings can’t have any properties at all”), but it is in fact logical. If this proposition were false, then it would say “If it’s not possible that a supreme being exists, then supreme beings can still be supreme”. Clearly, this is not the case.

2. A property that supreme beings must have is a perfection

Support:: This is from the axiom that if a property is a necessary condition for being supreme, then that property is a perfection.

Objection: If a supreme being is impossible, then there are no properties that are required for being a perfection. So this premise requires you to already agree with the conclusion (that it is possible that a supreme being exists). The argument is guilty of begging the question.

3. ”Not being supreme” is not a perfection

Support:: This is from the axiom that if something is a perfection, then its negation is not a perfection.

Objection: But if a supreme being is impossible, then every property is a perfection. Thus, accepting this premise seems to require you to already accept the conclusion (that it is possible that a supreme being exists), and hence the argument is guilty of begging the question.

4. Therefore, it is possible that a supreme being exists

Support:: From 1,2,3

Existence

1. It’s possible that a supreme being exists

Support:: From the previous argument

2. Therefore, there actually exists a being for whom it is possible that it is impossible for someone else to be greater than

Support:: From 1 and from the logical axiom called Barcan. This axiom states: “if everything is necessarily P, then necessarily, everything is P.” The logical equivalent of this axiom (used in this argument) is: “If it’s possible that there is something that is P, then there actually is something that is possibly P.” This is a logical axiom that can be derived from other principles of logic.

Objection: The Barcan formula is widely accepted, but still controversial. It means that if it is possible that I had a sibling, then there actually is a being who is possibly my sibling. Seems crazy on the face of it, but it is derivable from other logical axioms. So the Barcan formula is a weak spot in the argument, but per Oppy the above objection about question-begging is much stronger.

3. Therefore, there is a being for whom it is impossible for someone to be greater than

Support:: From the logical axiom that if something is possibly impossible, then it is impossible.

4. Therefore, a supreme being exists

Support:: From 3.

Evidential Problem of Evil

Evidential Problem of Evil

This argument attempts to decrease the probability of the existence of the God of classical theism, unlike the logical problem of evil which attempts to refute it.

William Rowe's formulation

One of the more influential versions of the argument, first published in 1978.

(1) God would prevent suffering, unless he could not do so without losing a greater good

(2) There exist examples of suffering that God could have prevented without losing some greater good

(3) Therefore, God does not exist

Premise 1

Support for premise 1 is appeal to traditional notions of God as all-good. Most theists agree with premise 1.

However, open theism is opposed to premise 1. Open theism is the view that God's omniscience does not include foreknowledge (knowing what free agents other than God will do) or middle knowledge (knowing what free agents would have alternately done in any situation). But open theism advocates a God that is not as involved in human affairs, since he does not know the future and is playing dice with history. In this sense, open theism is more like deism and less compatible with the classical definition of God.

Premise 2

Most critics focus on premise 2 of the argument. Rowe supports premise 2 with appeals to two examples of apparently "gratuitous" evil (evil that serves no greater good):

Evil 1: A deer trapped under a log in a forest fire, burned and slowly dying for days

Evil 2: A real-life example of a little girl who was raped and beaten to death by her mother's ex-boyfriend.

From these examples, Rowe asserts the following inference:

P: We do not know of any greater good that could arise from these evils

Q: Therefore, there is no greater good that could arise from these evils

Rowe includes among "greater goods" anything that we can conceive of, past or future. Even "eternal bliss" is an acceptable greater good according to Rowe. The inference from P to Q is inductive, but Rowe defends it as rational. I.e., the truth of P is taken to be strong evidential grounds for the truth of Q.

The Skeptical Theist response

The traditional concept of God is that his ways are unknowable to man, and hence this presents problems for the inference from P to Q. Wykstra developed this response in 1984, known as CORNEA.

Wykstra's CORNEA Critique

Stephen Wykstra's Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access (CORNEA) says the following:

C: A human is entitled to infer that [there is no x] from [so far as I can tell, there is no x] only if it is reasonable for that human to believe that if there were an x, it is likely that she would perceive it.

Wykstra calls this the "no-seeum assumption". This principle appears unobjectionable at first sight. Example: If someone looks at a garden from a distance and is unable to perceive any caterpillars in it, it is not reasonable for them to then assume that there aren't any.

Wykstra says that Rowe's inference from P to Q is a "no-seeum assumption." That if there is some greater good that will come about by allowing evils of the above type, it is unlikely human beings would be able to discern them.

Wykstra's parent analogy

Wykstra makes the analogy of a parent who allows her children to experience pains for greater goods (e.g. vaccination), and that a parent's cognitive abilities compared with her baby are at least comparable to human cognitivie abilities compared to God. So it is just as unlikely that we would be able to percieve God's reasons for allowing evils as it would be for a baby to perceive the reasons for a vaccination: not likely at all.

Alston's analogies

Wyksta's analogy is open to criticism, so Alston came up with two different ones:

Student: A student may not understand the reasons an expert does something, but from this he cannot infer that there are no reasons.

Scope of knowledge: If the field of knowledge in a subject is unknown in scope. I.e., because we can't find aliens, we cannot infer that there are no aliens out there.

Based on the above analogies, Alston concludes that Rowe's inference from P to Q is a "no-seeum inference" and hence invalid. However, Rowe responds that unlike in the two analogies, an all-good being should either tell us his reasons for permitting suffering, or at least make his presence more obvious.

Building a theodicy

A theodicy is an attempt to provide a plausible reason for God permitting suffering. This is distinguished from a "defense," which is used against the logical problem of evil by trying to show a possible reason that God allows suffering, even if that reason might be implausible.

Sketch of a theodicy

A theodicy might make use of several tactics. For instance:

Soul making: the idea that God uses pain and suffering for the betterment of character; a person partaking in only hedonistic pleasures non-stop will tend to have a bad character.

Free will: the idea that God allows morally significant free will so that human beings are moral agents and not just robots programmed to act a certain way.

Heavenly bliss: the idea that after death a soul will go to heaven and experience eternal happiness.

So, for instance, the above evils might be explained by serious misuse of free will, soul-building for the people left alive, and eternal heavenly bliss for those who die.

Objections: Dispute that free will exists; we have a duty to curtail someone's free will if they misuse it, and so Go should do the same; natural evil is difficult to account for with theodicies.

Responses to natural evil: Natural evil could be part of soul-building (Hick); it could be to give us knowledge of evil so that we know we know what moral choices are (Swinburne).

Further responses to the evidential problem of evil

If theists think the arguments for the existence of God are strong enough to offset the evidential problem of evil, they can turn the argument around to say that since an all good God exists, then gratuitous evil (evil that serves no greater good) does not exist. Rowe calls this the "G E Moore shift." The formal argument:

(1) God would prevent suffering, unless he could not do so without losing a greater good

(2) God exists

(3) Therefore, there is no suffering that God could have prevented without losing some greater good

Rowe says that this is the theists' best response. However, the problem is that the typical arguments for God (cosmological, teleological) do not seek to establish an all good being, and thus the theist faces severe difficulty in offsetting the obvious suffering in the world with arguments for an all good being.

Logical Problem of Evil

The Problem

The God of classical theism is defined as omnipotent, omniscient, and all good. But this conflicts with the existence of pain and suffering in the world, which indicates that God is either not omnipotent, not omniscient, or not all good. The formal argument:

(1) God is omniscient, omnipotent, and all good (from the classical definition of theism)

(2) Evil exists in the world

(3) If God is unable to prevent evil, then he is not omnipotent

(4) If God is unaware of evil, then he is not omniscient

(5) If God is unwilling to prevent evil, then he is not all good

(6) Therefore, God is either not omniscient, not omnipotent, or not good

(7) Both 1 and 6 are contradictory

(8) Therefore, the God of classical theism does not exist

Attempts to resolve this problem results in a lesser God than theists would be willing to accept. The problem of evil as a logical problem was primarily defended by J.L. Mackie in the mid-20th Century.

Logical Consistency

Logical consistency requires that it be possible for several statements to all be true at the same time. If it can be shown that there is a possible way of reconciling them, even if implausible or unlikely, then the statements are not logically contradictory.

Logical consistency and the logical problem of evil

If it is possible that God has a morally sufficient reason to permit evil, then the logical contradiction does not hold. The conclusion would then be that either God does not exist or that he has a morally sufficient reason to permit evil. An example would be of a child receiving a vaccination. So long as it's even possible that God has long-term, morally sufficient reasons for permitting evil, there is no logical contradiction between an all good God and the existence of evil.

Plantinga's Free Will Defense

Alvin Plantinga makes a suggestion for one possible morally sufficient reason that God would have for permitting evil: morally significant free will. This is defined as the ability of someone to choose between good and evil. Just as it would be absurd to praise a robot for emptying the trash when it was programmed to do that and nothing else, so too would it be absurd to praise someone for making a good moral decision if they had no moral choice in the matter. Consider possible worlds:

World 1: God gives people free will, and does not force them to always choose good; there is evil and suffering.

World 2: God does not give people free will, and forces them to always choose good; there is no evil and suffering.

World 3: God gives people free will, and forces them to always choose good; there is no evil and suffering.

World 4: God gives people free will, and does not force them to always choose good; there is no evil and suffering.

Plantinga says that World 3 is logically impossible; even God cannot force someone to freely do something. World 2 contains only automatons, and is hence undesirable on classical theism. This leaves World 1 and 4. World 1 describes the actual world, and World 4 describes a way the world could be: everyone has free will, but they all choose to do only good. The Book of Genesis hints that God intended the world to be like this.

Flew and Mackie maintain that God could and should have created World 3; Plantinga maintains that this is logically impossible.

Divine omnipotence and the Free Will Defense

Some scholars maintain that "omnipotence" should mean the ability to anything, even logically impossible things. But there are many things God cannot do: lie, cheat, be ignorant, etc. This supports the thesis there are things even an omnipotent being cannot do.

Objection: Free Will and Natural Evil

The free will defense does not say anything about natural evil (earthquakes, mosquitoes, etc), and so some think it is incomplete. Plantinga suggests that invisible demons could be responsible for natural evil and hence, are abusing their free will in  exactly the same way humans do. This response seems implausible, but to rebut a logical inconsistency all that needs to be shown is a possible way it can be reconciled, even if that is not the real reason for it or even if its plausible at all.

Was Plantinga's victory too easy?

J.L. Mackie, mostly associated with mid-20th Century atheism, concedes that Plantinga did away with the logical problem of evil. But he says that it is still unsatisfactory because Plantinga only deals with the possible and not the plausible; Plantinga does not give any evidence for his claim. However, most philosopher's agree that the blame lies with Mackie in making too strong a claim for the problem of evil and as a result most debate has turned to the evidential problem of evil instead.

Evaluation of the Free Will Defense

If a situation is claimed to be impossible, all that needs to be shown is a way for that situation to be possible. The possible situation does not need to be actual or even plausible, as long as it is conceivable then it is logically possible and hence the strong claim that the situation is impossible is refuted. The free will defense seems to fulfill this need and hence, the logical problem of evil is generally considered to be refuted.

Other Solutions to the Logical Problem of Evil

John Hick suggests that evil and suffering are part of a plan of "soul making," that is, shaping humans into the best that they can be. Evolution was a part of this process. This response is a theodicy instead of a defense: an attempt to provide an actual reason for evil rather than just a possible reason, as Plantinga does.

Eleonore Stump suggests that evil is what brings people closer to God; that without evil, constant joy and happiness would make people in love with worldly things rather than God.

Problems with the Free Will Defense

Heaven is usually conceived of as a place where it is impossible for people to do wrong. But if this is the ultimate desirable reward, then why is free will so valuable here on earth? If people lose their free will in heaven then are they the same people they were on earth? And if they keep their free will but are forced to always do good, then doesn't this mean that World 3 (above) is actually possible after all? If so, then Flew and Mackie's objections above are correct.

Secondly, If God is incapable of doing wrong, then it seems he does not have free will and hence, is not morally praiseworthy; this conflicts with classical theism. But if he does have free will but is incapable of doing wrong, then this seems to make World 3 (above) possible after all. If so, then Flew and Mackie's objections above are correct.