Faculties model: Only intelligent creatures capable of comprehending the Absolute Good (a la Plato and Aristotle) have free will, because they have the capacity to recognize the good and then choose to do it.
Hierarchical model: A 1st order desire is a desire to perform an action. A 2nd order desire is a desire to have a 1st order desire. A 2nd order volition is a desire to have a 1st order desire that becomes an actual action. On this model, free will is defined as a 2nd order volition. Objections: Vulnerable to brain washing. If someone is brain washed to have a 2nd order volition, then they aren't really free.
Reasons-response model: Someone has free will if they perform an action when there is a reason to perform that action. Avoids brainwashing problems because if someone is brainwashed to do something, but there is a reason for them not to do it, they can't choose not to do it and so they are not free.
Determinism
Definition: The conjunction of past events plus the laws of nature entails a unique future that could not be any other way. As for predictability, the future is only predictable if someone is smart enough and knows all the facts, beyond current human or computer capabilities.
Science: Whether determinism is true or not is a fact ultimate answerable by science. Either the laws of nature could turn out to be probabilistic and thus make determinism false, or if determinism is true then the acts of agents might be free from the laws of nature and thus free will still exists.
Near determinism: On the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics (which may be false), particles display indeterminate behavior; a particle going one way instead of another is not caused by any prior condition. However, it may be the case that larger objects of the familiar world still obey deterministic laws and thus is still relevant to the free will debate.
Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and pessimism
Compatibilism: Free will and determinism are compatible. However, does not take a position on whether determinism is true or not. Just that if it's true, then free will can still exist (though not necessarily).
Incompatibilism: Free will and determinism are not compatible. However, does not take a position on whether determinism is actually true or not. Just that if it's true, then free will cannot exist. Of incompatibilists, there are hard determinists: those who think determinism is true and thus free will does not exist. And libertarians: those who think determinism is false and thus free will does exist.
Pessimism: The position that even if determinism is false, free will is still not possible. Argues that if everything is random and uncaused then free will still could not exist in that kind of environment.
Arguments for incompatibilism
Consequence argument: The past is fixed in a way that future does not seem to be. However, determinism means that the conjunction of the fixed past plus the fixed laws of nature entail a fixed future, and since neither the past can be changed nor the laws of nature, then the future is just as fixed as the past. The formal argument:
Alpha: [It is necessary that p] implies that [no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p was true].
Beta: [No one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p was true and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether {p entails q}] implies that [no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether q was true].
(1) It is necessary that [{the past and the laws of nature} entail a unique future] (definition of determinism)
(2) It is necessary that [the past entails that {the laws of nature entail a unique future}] (from logical exportation of 1)
(3) No one has, or ever had, any choice about whether the [the past entails that {the laws of nature entail a unique future}] (from Alpha)
(4) No one has, or ever had, any choice about whether the past is true
(5) No one has, or ever had, any choice about whether [the laws of nature entail a unique future] (from 3, 4, and Beta)
(6) No one has, or ever had, any choice about whether the laws of nature are true
(7) No one has, or ever had, any choice about whether the future is true (from 5, 6, and Beta)
Origination argument: This assumes that free will is when an agent is the originator or "ultimate cause" of a new causal chain, as a "first cause." If that is what free will entails, then it is incompatible with determinism as determinism entails that every event (including actions by agents) are determined by a previous cause. The formal argument:
(1) An agent acts with free will only if she is the originator (or ultimate source) of her actions.
(2) If determinism is true, then everything any agent does is ultimately caused by events and circumstances outside her control.
(3) If everything an agent does is ultimately caused by events and circumstances beyond her control, then the agent is not the originator (or ultimate source) of her actions.
(4) Therefore, if determinism is true, then no agent is the originator (or ultimate source) of her actions.
(5) Therefore, if determinism is true, no agent has free will.
Arguments for compatibilism
Rejection of consequence 1: Argues that free will means that an agent would have had the ability to do otherwise than what they actually did. So if a determinism means that a fixed past and fixed laws of nature entail an agent perform some action, then if the past and the laws of nature were different then they could have performed a different action and thus, free will is preserved.
Rejection of consequence 2: Argues that Beta (see above) is invalid because it leads to false conclusions, such as that [no one has a choice whether {p is true}] and [no one has a choice whether {q is true}] entails that [no one has a choice about whether {p is true and q is true}].
Rejection of origination: Argues that free will does not mean that an agent is the ultimate originator of a new causal chain, i.e. that premise 1 is false. Accepts either a hierarchical model or a reasons-response model of free will. I.e., determinism would not stop someone from having a 2nd order volition (see above), nor would it stop someone having a certain response to certain reasons (see above).
Argument against the ability to do otherwise: If someone only has the ability to do one action (i.e. free will does not exist), but does not know it, then when they perform an action they are still making a moral "choice."
Reactive attitudes: Whether determinism is true or not or conflicts with free will or not should not stop us from having reactive moral attitudes (love, gratitude, etc) in our interpersonal relationships.
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