A brief list of the metaphysics of Aristotle and Aquinas. This is the philosophy of changing things; what specific changing thing there are, and what their nature is, is the job of science. This is much more general than natural science, applying to changing things in general, regardless of what types of changing things exist.
Form and Matter
Typical objects consist of matter that is structured a certain way. For example, an elephant consists of matter that is structured in the form of an elephant.This also entails...
Final Causes
...that they have a disposition to behave a certain way. Example: an elephant is disposed to reproduce, run away from enemies, eat, and so forth. This also entails...
Actual and Potential
...that a behavior is a potential to act a certain way, whereas that object is actually acting a certain way now. Example: right now the elephant is actually sleeping, but potentially running away from a hunter; later, it will be actually running away from a hunter.
Existence and Essence
From the "form" above, we have the definition of something, such as "an elephant." If that essence/form is to be real, it must be conjoined with matter. But for most things, this definition does not entail that thing's existence. Example: what an elephant is (large mammal with trunk, ears, etc) does not entail that it exists. It may or may not exist, but its definition alone does not entail that it does.
Showing posts with label metaphysics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label metaphysics. Show all posts
Monday, November 25, 2013
A Case for Causal Dispositions
It seems to be something we almost take for granted. But it is notoriously difficult to come up with a theory that describes what it is, exactly. What is causation, exactly? This article was inspired by Causation: A Very Short Introduction.
David Hume
One popular analysis of causation is that it consists of an event, followed by another event. Since we can't see, or detect, the actual causal connection between the two events, and all we detect are the events themselves, then this is all causation boils down to. This theory was popularized by David Hume, who was an empiricist and thus believed all knowledge comes through sense experience.Through the regular succession of events, we form a habit in our minds that event A will be followed by event B, and this is all causation is.
Problems with Hume
The theory cannot deal with accidental or coincidental correlations. When we do a randomized control trial on some new drug, and we see a percentage of patients improve, this event might be correlated with many different factors, such as a different diet eaten by the patients that improved. We seek to find out if the drug itself was the causal factor, and not just a correlation. As it is often said, "correlation is not causation."
In further addition, the Humean theory cannot deal with one-time causes. Perhaps there is some unique cause and effect that occurs only once in the history of the universe. But since Hume's theory requires regular correlation for something to be considered a cause/effect relationship, then single unique events cannot count as causation, even though after examining such a case we might conclude that it is in fact a cause/effect relationship.
Also, Hume's theory seems to presuppose some form of real causation, and not just correlation, in that it theorizes that we see an event followed by another event. In other words, the event caused us to see it. So this theory presupposes something more than just correlation.We need a better causal theory than this one.
Counterfactual Theories of Causation
Perhaps causation amounts to this: saying that A causes B means that if A had not occurred, B would not have occurred. Saying that the drunk driver caused the crash means that if the driver had not been on the road, the crash would not have occurred. This "counterfactual" theory of causation was popularized by David Lewis and is generally classified as "semi-Humean."
But it too faces problems.
Problems with Counterfactuals
One problem is that this account relies on a fiction: if A had not occurred then B would not have occurred, but how do we know what would have happened if A had not occurred? We can't empirically observe the event not occurring, because the event did occur. Lewis's theory relies on a fiction, so Lewis himself supports the theory that these other worlds actually exist. An infinite number of alternate worlds. Never mind the fact that this might be a bit much to believe, it also still faces problems. We can't observe these alternate worlds, so we still can't observe what would have happened had the drunk driver not been on the road that night.
And there are more problems. An effect could have multiple causes. Consider a firing squad, all shooting at the prisoner at the same time. Any single bullet would have been enough to kill the prisoner, but he was shot by multiple shooters at once. So if a shooter did not shoot, the effect (the prisoner's death) still would have occurred.
Also, we can have a case where if event A had not occurred, event B would not occur, but we still say that A did not cause B. Consider that if you had not woken up this morning, you would not have walked faster in your way to work. But your getting out of bed was not the cause of you walking faster. It was a necessary but insufficient condition for faster walking. So here again we have a counterexample to the causal theory at hand.
Is Causation the Transfer of Energy?
We often like to think of physical science as dealing with fundamental reality, so perhaps causation is some basic event from physical science. Energy transfer seems to be the basic events that occur in physics, so maybe causation is nothing more than the transfer of energy.
Problems with Energy Transfer
But again we have counterexamples: if we inject money into an economy, it causes inflation. This is not energy transfer, as money these days is often in terms of just numbers in a computer. So not all causation can be described as the transfer of energy.
Is Causation Primitive?
Perhaps the problem is that causation is a basic feature of the universe, and cannot be broken down into simpler concepts. Just like right now we think quarks are the basic particle of matter, and cannot be explained in terms of anything simpler. They are the bottom level, so to speak. Perhaps causation is the same. Remember Hume, above? His theory seemed to presuppose causation at a very basic level, as it relied on seeing or sensing an event, followed by seeing or sensing another event. So perhaps this is why none of the above theories can capture what we mean by causation: it is just a basic feature of the universe, unable to be broken down anymore.
Causal Dispositions
But even if this is the case, we can still examine causation and describe it. The idea of dispositions is this: an object has certain hidden properties or powers that dispose it to behave a certain way. For example, an object that is elastic is disposed to "snap back", even if this effect never actually occurs. It is disposed to behave one way rather than another way. An object that is "elastic" is disposed to snap back, but not disposed to catch fire. An object that is "flammable" is disposed to catch fire, but not disposed to snap back. And so on. This seems to capture what we mean by causation better than any of the theories above.
Historically, empiricists have not embraced the dispositional theory of causation, because "dispositions" are ephemeral. They cannot be measured, observed, or quantified. You can observe and measure a property that an object actually has, such as mass, or charge. You can put numbers on them. But you can't do the same with dispositions because they don't even really exist yet, in a way. They are a propensity to behave a certain way, which is not a property that can be observed.
Yet, if this analysis of causation is plausible, then it is still correct, despite our inability to observe them.
David Hume
One popular analysis of causation is that it consists of an event, followed by another event. Since we can't see, or detect, the actual causal connection between the two events, and all we detect are the events themselves, then this is all causation boils down to. This theory was popularized by David Hume, who was an empiricist and thus believed all knowledge comes through sense experience.Through the regular succession of events, we form a habit in our minds that event A will be followed by event B, and this is all causation is.
Problems with Hume
The theory cannot deal with accidental or coincidental correlations. When we do a randomized control trial on some new drug, and we see a percentage of patients improve, this event might be correlated with many different factors, such as a different diet eaten by the patients that improved. We seek to find out if the drug itself was the causal factor, and not just a correlation. As it is often said, "correlation is not causation."
In further addition, the Humean theory cannot deal with one-time causes. Perhaps there is some unique cause and effect that occurs only once in the history of the universe. But since Hume's theory requires regular correlation for something to be considered a cause/effect relationship, then single unique events cannot count as causation, even though after examining such a case we might conclude that it is in fact a cause/effect relationship.
Also, Hume's theory seems to presuppose some form of real causation, and not just correlation, in that it theorizes that we see an event followed by another event. In other words, the event caused us to see it. So this theory presupposes something more than just correlation.We need a better causal theory than this one.
Counterfactual Theories of Causation
Perhaps causation amounts to this: saying that A causes B means that if A had not occurred, B would not have occurred. Saying that the drunk driver caused the crash means that if the driver had not been on the road, the crash would not have occurred. This "counterfactual" theory of causation was popularized by David Lewis and is generally classified as "semi-Humean."
But it too faces problems.
Problems with Counterfactuals
One problem is that this account relies on a fiction: if A had not occurred then B would not have occurred, but how do we know what would have happened if A had not occurred? We can't empirically observe the event not occurring, because the event did occur. Lewis's theory relies on a fiction, so Lewis himself supports the theory that these other worlds actually exist. An infinite number of alternate worlds. Never mind the fact that this might be a bit much to believe, it also still faces problems. We can't observe these alternate worlds, so we still can't observe what would have happened had the drunk driver not been on the road that night.
And there are more problems. An effect could have multiple causes. Consider a firing squad, all shooting at the prisoner at the same time. Any single bullet would have been enough to kill the prisoner, but he was shot by multiple shooters at once. So if a shooter did not shoot, the effect (the prisoner's death) still would have occurred.
Also, we can have a case where if event A had not occurred, event B would not occur, but we still say that A did not cause B. Consider that if you had not woken up this morning, you would not have walked faster in your way to work. But your getting out of bed was not the cause of you walking faster. It was a necessary but insufficient condition for faster walking. So here again we have a counterexample to the causal theory at hand.
Is Causation the Transfer of Energy?
We often like to think of physical science as dealing with fundamental reality, so perhaps causation is some basic event from physical science. Energy transfer seems to be the basic events that occur in physics, so maybe causation is nothing more than the transfer of energy.
Problems with Energy Transfer
But again we have counterexamples: if we inject money into an economy, it causes inflation. This is not energy transfer, as money these days is often in terms of just numbers in a computer. So not all causation can be described as the transfer of energy.
Is Causation Primitive?
Perhaps the problem is that causation is a basic feature of the universe, and cannot be broken down into simpler concepts. Just like right now we think quarks are the basic particle of matter, and cannot be explained in terms of anything simpler. They are the bottom level, so to speak. Perhaps causation is the same. Remember Hume, above? His theory seemed to presuppose causation at a very basic level, as it relied on seeing or sensing an event, followed by seeing or sensing another event. So perhaps this is why none of the above theories can capture what we mean by causation: it is just a basic feature of the universe, unable to be broken down anymore.
Causal Dispositions
But even if this is the case, we can still examine causation and describe it. The idea of dispositions is this: an object has certain hidden properties or powers that dispose it to behave a certain way. For example, an object that is elastic is disposed to "snap back", even if this effect never actually occurs. It is disposed to behave one way rather than another way. An object that is "elastic" is disposed to snap back, but not disposed to catch fire. An object that is "flammable" is disposed to catch fire, but not disposed to snap back. And so on. This seems to capture what we mean by causation better than any of the theories above.
Historically, empiricists have not embraced the dispositional theory of causation, because "dispositions" are ephemeral. They cannot be measured, observed, or quantified. You can observe and measure a property that an object actually has, such as mass, or charge. You can put numbers on them. But you can't do the same with dispositions because they don't even really exist yet, in a way. They are a propensity to behave a certain way, which is not a property that can be observed.
Yet, if this analysis of causation is plausible, then it is still correct, despite our inability to observe them.
Thursday, November 14, 2013
Philosophy of Nature vs Metaphysics vs Physics
The classical arguments for the existence of God are not arguments from natural science, like most modern theistic arguments try to be, but rather are firmly rooted in the philosophy of nature. Appealing to physics or natural science to refute them thus makes a category error.
Metaphysics
Deals with existence in general, regardless of the specific objects that happen to exist. What does it mean to "exist"? Do categories exist? Sets? And so on...
Philosophy of Nature
Deals with change in general, regardless of what types of changing objects happen to exist. What does it mean for something to change? Does change occur?
Physics (and natural sciences)
Deals with the specific changing objects that happen to exist, and examines their specific behavior and natures.
Conclusion
As you can see, metaphysics and philosophy of nature operate independently of what the sciences are doing. Perhaps science had discovered instead that reality consists of little triangles that compose everything. Nonetheless, philosophy of nature, in dealing with change in general, would still carry on independently of that.
Metaphysics
Deals with existence in general, regardless of the specific objects that happen to exist. What does it mean to "exist"? Do categories exist? Sets? And so on...
Philosophy of Nature
Deals with change in general, regardless of what types of changing objects happen to exist. What does it mean for something to change? Does change occur?
Physics (and natural sciences)
Deals with the specific changing objects that happen to exist, and examines their specific behavior and natures.
Conclusion
As you can see, metaphysics and philosophy of nature operate independently of what the sciences are doing. Perhaps science had discovered instead that reality consists of little triangles that compose everything. Nonetheless, philosophy of nature, in dealing with change in general, would still carry on independently of that.
Monday, October 28, 2013
Why a "Vertical" Causal Series Requires a First Cause
Consider a series of events, with each one causing the next. The Big Bang, the expansion of the universe, the motion of matter, the solar system, and so on. Each event leads to the next. This is a "horizontal" causal series, and short of attempts to prove that an infinity is impossible, there is nothing about this series that logically demands a first event. Perhaps the string of events stretch back into the past for an infinite amount of time. The key point here is that this series involves in fieri causes.
Now consider a series of dependency causes. In other words, a series of in esse causes. An existent thing, such as a lake, is here and now dependent upon warm air, which is in turn here and now dependent upon the heat from the Sun, which is dependent upon the nuclear reactions in the Sun, which are dependent upon gravity pulling the Sun in on itself, which is dependent upon mass, and so on. Unlike a chain of events, a series of dependency causes is "vertical", going "down" to the most fundamental thing. And unlike a horizontal chain of causes, a vertical chain requires a first cause. "First" in this sense simple means something that is not dependent upon anything further. The "bottom level" in the present, not the first event in the past.
To see why this is so, think about living after the Zombie Apocalypse. Banded together with other survivors, one day you are monitoring for radio transmissions when you hear something. "Hello?....*static* *garbled*... Hello? If you can hear me, we have surviv...h....*garbled*...."
Excited, you think, "Where is that coming from?!" You tell your friends that you are receiving a radio transmission from another group of survivors and that you should go try to find the source of this transmission. Maybe you can pool your resources and begin to rebuild society! After a long journey, you discover the source of the transmission: it is a radio tower acting as a repeater. It receives a radio wave, amplifies it, and then re-transmits it.
Damn. A bust. But wait! The repeater is also a receiver, so you really have not discovered the source of the radio waves. You need to keep going. That transmission must be coming from somewhere! Eventually, let's say, you find the survivors and everyone lives happily ever after. The point is, you were receiving a radio transmission, and this entailed that someone was transmitting. No matter how many repeater towers were between you and the survivors, someone or some thing (maybe just a recording) was transmitting. To make it into a formal argument:
1. If there is no transmitter of X, then there is no X to be received
2. But something is receiving X
3. Therefore, there is a transmitter of X
So the chain of dependency causes involve each member "receiving" existence from the next member of the chain. The lake receives its current, sustaining, in esse existence from the warm air, which receives its existence from the Sun's nuclear reactions, which receives its existence from gravity, and so on. And this can only bottom out in a transmitter of existence: something that can actualize without needing to be actualized by anything further.
For further reading, see this paper.
Now consider a series of dependency causes. In other words, a series of in esse causes. An existent thing, such as a lake, is here and now dependent upon warm air, which is in turn here and now dependent upon the heat from the Sun, which is dependent upon the nuclear reactions in the Sun, which are dependent upon gravity pulling the Sun in on itself, which is dependent upon mass, and so on. Unlike a chain of events, a series of dependency causes is "vertical", going "down" to the most fundamental thing. And unlike a horizontal chain of causes, a vertical chain requires a first cause. "First" in this sense simple means something that is not dependent upon anything further. The "bottom level" in the present, not the first event in the past.
To see why this is so, think about living after the Zombie Apocalypse. Banded together with other survivors, one day you are monitoring for radio transmissions when you hear something. "Hello?....*static* *garbled*... Hello? If you can hear me, we have surviv...h....*garbled*...."
Excited, you think, "Where is that coming from?!" You tell your friends that you are receiving a radio transmission from another group of survivors and that you should go try to find the source of this transmission. Maybe you can pool your resources and begin to rebuild society! After a long journey, you discover the source of the transmission: it is a radio tower acting as a repeater. It receives a radio wave, amplifies it, and then re-transmits it.
Damn. A bust. But wait! The repeater is also a receiver, so you really have not discovered the source of the radio waves. You need to keep going. That transmission must be coming from somewhere! Eventually, let's say, you find the survivors and everyone lives happily ever after. The point is, you were receiving a radio transmission, and this entailed that someone was transmitting. No matter how many repeater towers were between you and the survivors, someone or some thing (maybe just a recording) was transmitting. To make it into a formal argument:
1. If there is no transmitter of X, then there is no X to be received
2. But something is receiving X
3. Therefore, there is a transmitter of X
So the chain of dependency causes involve each member "receiving" existence from the next member of the chain. The lake receives its current, sustaining, in esse existence from the warm air, which receives its existence from the Sun's nuclear reactions, which receives its existence from gravity, and so on. And this can only bottom out in a transmitter of existence: something that can actualize without needing to be actualized by anything further.
For further reading, see this paper.
In Fieri vs In Esse
You, an ironsmith, create a horseshoe. You are the cause of the horseshoe's coming into existence.
However, the iron's solidness, which is based upon further factors such as the strong and weak nuclear forces, the state of electrons in the iron, and so on are the causes of the horseshoe's continuing existence. These causes sustain it in existence from moment to moment.
The first type of cause is called "in fieri." The second type is called "in esse."
However, the iron's solidness, which is based upon further factors such as the strong and weak nuclear forces, the state of electrons in the iron, and so on are the causes of the horseshoe's continuing existence. These causes sustain it in existence from moment to moment.
The first type of cause is called "in fieri." The second type is called "in esse."
Tuesday, October 15, 2013
Can Something Come from Nothing?
Empircal
Can something come to be without any explanatory conditions at all? We see inductive evidence against this all day, every day. If a plant grows from the ground, it comes to be from further explanatory conditions, such as a seed, sunlight, water, etc. The entirety of science is founded on the assumption that we can explain the things we see around us, and we constantly have confirmation that this is true and never see any sign that it isn't.
Logical
P1: No thing is a lack of a thing.
P2: That which applies to a thing does not apply to the lack of a thing.
P3: Causes and effects apply to things, therefore,
C1: A lack of a thing cannot cause a thing, or be the effect of a thing.
Can something come to be without any explanatory conditions at all? We see inductive evidence against this all day, every day. If a plant grows from the ground, it comes to be from further explanatory conditions, such as a seed, sunlight, water, etc. The entirety of science is founded on the assumption that we can explain the things we see around us, and we constantly have confirmation that this is true and never see any sign that it isn't.
Logical
P1: No thing is a lack of a thing.
P2: That which applies to a thing does not apply to the lack of a thing.
P3: Causes and effects apply to things, therefore,
C1: A lack of a thing cannot cause a thing, or be the effect of a thing.
Saturday, February 18, 2012
Aquinas' Metaphysics: Express Version
I. Universals
In the sentence, "Socrates is a human", the subject refers to an individual and the predicate refers to the universal "humanity", over and above any individual human. "Humanity" is an abstract; it doesn't refer to any concrete individual but rather to the concept of "being human." For Aquinas, universals are not just in our minds but are quite real. Unlike Plato's famous theory of Forms, however, he doesn't think they exist in a third ghostly realm. He thinks they just exist in the things themselves. The humanity of Socrates exists in Socrates himself.
II. Potentiality and Actuality
Things change: rivers flow, trees grow, people are born and die. Change in involves the switch from potential to actual. A seed is actually a seed and potentially a tree. When it becomes a tree, the potentiality becomes actuality. Most things around us are a mix of potential and actual. Something cannot be just potential with no actuality, as this is a logical contradiction. E.g., you can't have a potential tree that is not also an actual seed. However, there is no contradiction in the idea of something that is just actual.
III. Matter and Form
The normal objects of our experience consist of a composite of form and matter. They can't be broken down any more than that composite. So for example, Rex would consist of matter + the form of dog. There is no such thing as "just matter" with no form, because even a single quark has the form of: one quark.
IV. Essence and Existence
The "essence" of something is that list of properties that make it the thing it is rather than some other thing. The essence of a triangle, for example, is to have three sides (among others). If it didn't have that, it just wouldn't be a triangle. "Existence" is whether the thing actually exists or not. For most things in our experience, existence and essence are separate. I.e., existence is not included in the essence of most things.
V. Four Causes
To get a complete description of something, you need to know four aspects of it: what it's made of (material cause), the structure it takes (formal cause), what brought it into existence (efficient cause), and what it does (final cause).
VI. Potential and Actual Applies Across the Board
The potential/actual distinction applies across the entire Thomistic metaphysical system. Matter is potential, and when conjoined with form it becomes actual. Essence is potential, and when conjoined with existence it is actual.
In the sentence, "Socrates is a human", the subject refers to an individual and the predicate refers to the universal "humanity", over and above any individual human. "Humanity" is an abstract; it doesn't refer to any concrete individual but rather to the concept of "being human." For Aquinas, universals are not just in our minds but are quite real. Unlike Plato's famous theory of Forms, however, he doesn't think they exist in a third ghostly realm. He thinks they just exist in the things themselves. The humanity of Socrates exists in Socrates himself.
II. Potentiality and Actuality
Things change: rivers flow, trees grow, people are born and die. Change in involves the switch from potential to actual. A seed is actually a seed and potentially a tree. When it becomes a tree, the potentiality becomes actuality. Most things around us are a mix of potential and actual. Something cannot be just potential with no actuality, as this is a logical contradiction. E.g., you can't have a potential tree that is not also an actual seed. However, there is no contradiction in the idea of something that is just actual.
III. Matter and Form
The normal objects of our experience consist of a composite of form and matter. They can't be broken down any more than that composite. So for example, Rex would consist of matter + the form of dog. There is no such thing as "just matter" with no form, because even a single quark has the form of: one quark.
IV. Essence and Existence
The "essence" of something is that list of properties that make it the thing it is rather than some other thing. The essence of a triangle, for example, is to have three sides (among others). If it didn't have that, it just wouldn't be a triangle. "Existence" is whether the thing actually exists or not. For most things in our experience, existence and essence are separate. I.e., existence is not included in the essence of most things.
V. Four Causes
To get a complete description of something, you need to know four aspects of it: what it's made of (material cause), the structure it takes (formal cause), what brought it into existence (efficient cause), and what it does (final cause).
VI. Potential and Actual Applies Across the Board
The potential/actual distinction applies across the entire Thomistic metaphysical system. Matter is potential, and when conjoined with form it becomes actual. Essence is potential, and when conjoined with existence it is actual.
Saturday, September 3, 2011
Aristotle's Revenge
Eliminative Materialism
Eliminative materialism seeks to “eliminate” the mind entirely, by denying qualia, or intentionality (the ability of something to be about something other than itself), or propositional attitudes (belief that x, hope that x, desire that x, etc). This follows necessarily from the modern version of materialism, which denies Aristotelian formal and final causes and only embraces material and efficient causes. If everything is just particles and forces bumping around (just material and efficient causes), then on this view there can be no mind because there can be no intentionality (pointing to something beyond itself). So EM says that beliefs, desires, and so forth do not exist and will be replaced by neuroscientific concepts: “activation of sodium ions in xyz dendrites”, and so forth.
It is important to note that this theory does not say that “activation of sodium ions in dendrites” is the cause of beliefs and desires (which would be trivial), but that there are no such things as beliefs and desires and so forth, there is only the neuroscientific facts.
One problem with this is that it does not involve replacement of the mind with successor concepts, but rather just examples of inference, metonymy, and semantic shift. You can infer smoke from fire, but you have not replaced the smoke with fire. When Barak Obama speaks, you can refer to him as “Washington” (a metonym) but you have not replaced Obama with Washington.
EM theories of mind destroy reason and science, because both of those terms require intentionality and mind to function. Few materialists are eliminative materialists for this reason. However, if final and formal causes are rejected, then it is hard to see how there could be any other result than eliminative materialism. The mind, in pointing beyond itself as it does when it develops theories, and reasons, is an example of final causality.
Materialist Theory of Mind
Irreducible Teleology
1. Biology: Evolutionary biology is laden with teleological terminology: the heart is for pumping blood, the liver is for purifying blood, sex is pleasurable so that we procreate, etc. Since final causes are out, then these have to be eliminated some how. Philosophers of science have proposed a few ways of doing this.
One way is to simply reword them as efficient causes. “The heart’s purpose is to pump blood” really means “ancestors of this creature who had proto-hearts survived in greater numbers than their neighbors, passing along the genes for hearts, which became more complex over time because those who had more complex hearts survived in greater numbers... etc”.
This is a problem because it seeks to explain final causes as “really” just a kind of efficient cause. But final causes are not efficient causes, and so this is a pointless exercise, like trying to explain how an apple is really just a kind of orange. It also leads to absurdities. It suggests that we can’t know what something is for unless we know its evolutionary history. But consider swampman. Swampman was created when lightning struck a puddle of mud. He is physically identical to humans. In his case, though, we can’t say that his heart is for pumping blood because his heart did not evolve. We can’t say it does anything. This is clearly absurd.
John Searle says that reducing final causes to efficient causes is a pointless exercise, because evolution isn’t supposed to be about teleology at all. Teleology should not be reduced, but eliminated. So the above exercise in explaining teleology is really an exercise in eliminating it.
However, eliminating teleology is impossible. Eliminating it in one place just makes it pop up somewhere else. Even in John Searle’s own proposal, which is to eliminate teleology by saying that it is in our minds, where we assign a normative value to the causal process. But “assigning a normative value” is itself goal-directedness, or teleology, and so this has just shifted the location of teleology without getting rid of it.
Daniel Dennet says that the functions of bodily organs and so forth are not there intrinsically either, but instead of saying that it is in our minds, he says that it is the result of the “purposes” and “goals” of natural selection. But if he is serious, then he is embracing Aristotle’s final causes. If it is just a figure of speech, then it has no explanatory power at all.
What he might mean is what he calls the “intentional stance.” We act as if the burglar alarm “knows” we are home. We act as if the fire alarm “knows” there is a fire. Similarly, Dennet says, we act as if nature has unconscious goals or purposes. But if this is just in his own mind, then it has no explanatory power at all. If it’s something in reality, then he is talking about unconscious final causes (Aristotelian teleology) and thus he is abandoning his naturalism. If he says that our intentional stance derives from natural selection, but natural selection derives its intentionality from our mind, then he is going around in a circle. Dennet is ambiguous as to what he means, and this rhetorical sleight of hand is what gives his position any plausibility at all.
Finally, teleology is most often relocated to DNA, which consists of “blueprints” and “algorithms” and the like. Dawkins speaks of genes being “selfish”. Etc. But as above, in a world of just particles, nothing can count as a symbol unless some mind interprets it that way. Yet DNA contains blueprints for lifeforms, and so “points to” or “aims at” something beyond itself, even though there is no mind interpreting it that way. It is an unconscious symbol. This is Arisotle’s final causes. Removing this unconscious teleology from DNA strips it of all the explanatory power that it has in biology.
2. Non-organic cycles
There are certain causal chains that have significance that others do not. The causal chain that begins with a cat and ends with a certain brain state is significant in a way that the causal chain that begins with the fur of the cat and ends six inches in front of our eyes is not.
There is teleology in the water and rock cycles as well. Water evaporates, condensation occurs, rains happens, and the cycle starts again. Igneous rock forms, then metamorphic, which melts into magma, and the cycle begins again.
It won't do to frame these in efficient causes only. The magma may cause bird migrations. Sediment may block water flow to a region. Condensation may cause arthritis. But each of these things are inherently directed towards a specific effect that is in their nature. Condensation may be the efficient cause of arthritis, but it is in it's nature directed at the specific effect of causing rain. That is what it inherently points to.
3. Laws of Nature
The modern conception of the laws of nature are inherited from Hume. Since final causes (inherent powers) cannot be observed or empirically verified, therefore they either do not exist or we cannot know about them. So to say that X regularly causes Y is just to say that there is a law like regularity between the two, but no inherent or necessary connection. Science is in the business of uncovering these law-like regularities.
But this does not seem right. Science always talks about idealizations, like frictionless surfaces, that are never actually realized. Science extrapolates these from a few experiments. It seems to be in the business of uncovering the hidden powers of things, not just a law-like regularity. If it were finding law-like regularity, then it would have to observe multiple instances of this and infer via induction that it holds everywhere. But on a Humean account, since there are no inherent powers or final causes, induction becomes impossible to justify.
Some (otherwise non-theistic) philosophers of science agree with this view, which they call “new essentialism.” That there are inherent powers in things, directed towards specific effects. This is, of course, nothing less than Aristotelian final causality.
Eliminative materialism seeks to “eliminate” the mind entirely, by denying qualia, or intentionality (the ability of something to be about something other than itself), or propositional attitudes (belief that x, hope that x, desire that x, etc). This follows necessarily from the modern version of materialism, which denies Aristotelian formal and final causes and only embraces material and efficient causes. If everything is just particles and forces bumping around (just material and efficient causes), then on this view there can be no mind because there can be no intentionality (pointing to something beyond itself). So EM says that beliefs, desires, and so forth do not exist and will be replaced by neuroscientific concepts: “activation of sodium ions in xyz dendrites”, and so forth.
It is important to note that this theory does not say that “activation of sodium ions in dendrites” is the cause of beliefs and desires (which would be trivial), but that there are no such things as beliefs and desires and so forth, there is only the neuroscientific facts.
One problem with this is that it does not involve replacement of the mind with successor concepts, but rather just examples of inference, metonymy, and semantic shift. You can infer smoke from fire, but you have not replaced the smoke with fire. When Barak Obama speaks, you can refer to him as “Washington” (a metonym) but you have not replaced Obama with Washington.
EM theories of mind destroy reason and science, because both of those terms require intentionality and mind to function. Few materialists are eliminative materialists for this reason. However, if final and formal causes are rejected, then it is hard to see how there could be any other result than eliminative materialism. The mind, in pointing beyond itself as it does when it develops theories, and reasons, is an example of final causality.
Materialist Theory of Mind
The main materialist theories of mind state that the mind is a sort of software, running on the hardware of the brain. The program contains symbols that represent the world and are manipulated via algorithms. But there are many problems with this view.
1. Symbols: If everything is just particles bumping around, then nothing counts as a symbol unless some mind interprets it as such. Particles arranged in the form of a picture of the world can only count as a symbol of the world if some mind interprets it that way. Apart from an interpretive mind, the particles arranged in a picture of the world are just meaningless particles. Since the materialist account of the mind is that thought is a symbol in the software in the brain, but nothing material can be a symbol without an interpretive mind, then this theory loops back around to mind and is not successful in reducing mind to matter.
2. Algorithms: Similarly, nothing counts as a “program” or an “algorithm” unless some mind interprets it as such. I follow an algorithm to move around a desk, and a marble also rolls around a desk due to an earthquake, only I can be said to be following an algorithm. The marble, being unconscious, is not. For something to be a “program” requires a mind, then similarly this theory is similarly circular like above.
3. Representation: It is theorized that for something to be a symbol requires it to be associated with something for awhile. If A is constantly associated with B, then A comes to symbolize B. But the problem is that the causal chain from A to B extends beyond these two in both directions. The sunlight, hitting the snake, going to eyes, going into brain, brain event, a linked brain event, etc. It takes a mind to decide that A and B are the begin and end points. Thus, also circular.
4. Meaning: For the mind to process a logical deduction, the mind performs a calculation like a calculator. The calculator input takes 1 + 2 and then gives back the symbol 3. However, the accuracy of this entirely depends on someone interpreting the symbols to represent “1” and “+” and “2”. If we instead interpret the 1 symbol to actually mean “3”, and the 2 symbol to actually mean “4”, then the calculator will give nonsensical answers. I.e., without us around to interpret the symbols correctly, the calculator is not actually adding or subtracting or doing anything coherent at all. Similarly, materialism of the mind aims to have the logical thought process as an unconscious manipulation of symbols, but like the calculator, without a mind around to add (coherent) meaning to these symbols, the mind can’t be doing anything coherent at all. And once again, mind is needed to be brought in to explain mind, and the materialist reduction is unsuccessful.
Aristotelian Teleology
However, if formal and final causes exist in nature, then the above materialist theories of mind would not be a problem. If you have inherent tendency for things to point to something beyond themselves, then you could appeal to unconscious symbols, programs and so forth in nature to account for mind. If you have formal causes, then the intellect can contain these universal forms and give us knowledge about the world. The above theories would then be perfectly intelligible.
Dualism of the mind is a byproduct of the rejection of formal and final causes. Since the mind is the clearest case of these, it becomes necessary then to postulate another mysterious substance that is not material. If you want to avoid eliminative materialism but keep the mind, dualism follows necessarily. To avoid both, it is necessary to bring back formal and final causes.
The mind is where materialists dump everything that does not fit the mechanistic picture of the world (devoid of formal and final causes). This is why the mind will continue to resist materialist reduction. It is like cleaning a house by sweeping all the dirt in it under a single rug, and then claiming you are going to get rid of the rug in the same way.
Irreducible Teleology
1. Biology: Evolutionary biology is laden with teleological terminology: the heart is for pumping blood, the liver is for purifying blood, sex is pleasurable so that we procreate, etc. Since final causes are out, then these have to be eliminated some how. Philosophers of science have proposed a few ways of doing this.
One way is to simply reword them as efficient causes. “The heart’s purpose is to pump blood” really means “ancestors of this creature who had proto-hearts survived in greater numbers than their neighbors, passing along the genes for hearts, which became more complex over time because those who had more complex hearts survived in greater numbers... etc”.
This is a problem because it seeks to explain final causes as “really” just a kind of efficient cause. But final causes are not efficient causes, and so this is a pointless exercise, like trying to explain how an apple is really just a kind of orange. It also leads to absurdities. It suggests that we can’t know what something is for unless we know its evolutionary history. But consider swampman. Swampman was created when lightning struck a puddle of mud. He is physically identical to humans. In his case, though, we can’t say that his heart is for pumping blood because his heart did not evolve. We can’t say it does anything. This is clearly absurd.
John Searle says that reducing final causes to efficient causes is a pointless exercise, because evolution isn’t supposed to be about teleology at all. Teleology should not be reduced, but eliminated. So the above exercise in explaining teleology is really an exercise in eliminating it.
However, eliminating teleology is impossible. Eliminating it in one place just makes it pop up somewhere else. Even in John Searle’s own proposal, which is to eliminate teleology by saying that it is in our minds, where we assign a normative value to the causal process. But “assigning a normative value” is itself goal-directedness, or teleology, and so this has just shifted the location of teleology without getting rid of it.
Daniel Dennet says that the functions of bodily organs and so forth are not there intrinsically either, but instead of saying that it is in our minds, he says that it is the result of the “purposes” and “goals” of natural selection. But if he is serious, then he is embracing Aristotle’s final causes. If it is just a figure of speech, then it has no explanatory power at all.
What he might mean is what he calls the “intentional stance.” We act as if the burglar alarm “knows” we are home. We act as if the fire alarm “knows” there is a fire. Similarly, Dennet says, we act as if nature has unconscious goals or purposes. But if this is just in his own mind, then it has no explanatory power at all. If it’s something in reality, then he is talking about unconscious final causes (Aristotelian teleology) and thus he is abandoning his naturalism. If he says that our intentional stance derives from natural selection, but natural selection derives its intentionality from our mind, then he is going around in a circle. Dennet is ambiguous as to what he means, and this rhetorical sleight of hand is what gives his position any plausibility at all.
Finally, teleology is most often relocated to DNA, which consists of “blueprints” and “algorithms” and the like. Dawkins speaks of genes being “selfish”. Etc. But as above, in a world of just particles, nothing can count as a symbol unless some mind interprets it that way. Yet DNA contains blueprints for lifeforms, and so “points to” or “aims at” something beyond itself, even though there is no mind interpreting it that way. It is an unconscious symbol. This is Arisotle’s final causes. Removing this unconscious teleology from DNA strips it of all the explanatory power that it has in biology.
2. Non-organic cycles
There are certain causal chains that have significance that others do not. The causal chain that begins with a cat and ends with a certain brain state is significant in a way that the causal chain that begins with the fur of the cat and ends six inches in front of our eyes is not.
There is teleology in the water and rock cycles as well. Water evaporates, condensation occurs, rains happens, and the cycle starts again. Igneous rock forms, then metamorphic, which melts into magma, and the cycle begins again.
It won't do to frame these in efficient causes only. The magma may cause bird migrations. Sediment may block water flow to a region. Condensation may cause arthritis. But each of these things are inherently directed towards a specific effect that is in their nature. Condensation may be the efficient cause of arthritis, but it is in it's nature directed at the specific effect of causing rain. That is what it inherently points to.
3. Laws of Nature
The modern conception of the laws of nature are inherited from Hume. Since final causes (inherent powers) cannot be observed or empirically verified, therefore they either do not exist or we cannot know about them. So to say that X regularly causes Y is just to say that there is a law like regularity between the two, but no inherent or necessary connection. Science is in the business of uncovering these law-like regularities.
But this does not seem right. Science always talks about idealizations, like frictionless surfaces, that are never actually realized. Science extrapolates these from a few experiments. It seems to be in the business of uncovering the hidden powers of things, not just a law-like regularity. If it were finding law-like regularity, then it would have to observe multiple instances of this and infer via induction that it holds everywhere. But on a Humean account, since there are no inherent powers or final causes, induction becomes impossible to justify.
Some (otherwise non-theistic) philosophers of science agree with this view, which they call “new essentialism.” That there are inherent powers in things, directed towards specific effects. This is, of course, nothing less than Aristotelian final causality.
Saturday, August 27, 2011
Free Will and Determinism
Free Will
Determinism
Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and pessimism
Arguments for incompatibilism
Faculties model: Only intelligent creatures capable of comprehending the Absolute Good (a la Plato and Aristotle) have free will, because they have the capacity to recognize the good and then choose to do it.
Hierarchical model: A 1st order desire is a desire to perform an action. A 2nd order desire is a desire to have a 1st order desire. A 2nd order volition is a desire to have a 1st order desire that becomes an actual action. On this model, free will is defined as a 2nd order volition. Objections: Vulnerable to brain washing. If someone is brain washed to have a 2nd order volition, then they aren't really free.
Reasons-response model: Someone has free will if they perform an action when there is a reason to perform that action. Avoids brainwashing problems because if someone is brainwashed to do something, but there is a reason for them not to do it, they can't choose not to do it and so they are not free.
Determinism
Definition: The conjunction of past events plus the laws of nature entails a unique future that could not be any other way. As for predictability, the future is only predictable if someone is smart enough and knows all the facts, beyond current human or computer capabilities.
Science: Whether determinism is true or not is a fact ultimate answerable by science. Either the laws of nature could turn out to be probabilistic and thus make determinism false, or if determinism is true then the acts of agents might be free from the laws of nature and thus free will still exists.
Near determinism: On the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics (which may be false), particles display indeterminate behavior; a particle going one way instead of another is not caused by any prior condition. However, it may be the case that larger objects of the familiar world still obey deterministic laws and thus is still relevant to the free will debate.
Compatibilism, incompatibilism, and pessimism
Compatibilism: Free will and determinism are compatible. However, does not take a position on whether determinism is true or not. Just that if it's true, then free will can still exist (though not necessarily).
Incompatibilism: Free will and determinism are not compatible. However, does not take a position on whether determinism is actually true or not. Just that if it's true, then free will cannot exist. Of incompatibilists, there are hard determinists: those who think determinism is true and thus free will does not exist. And libertarians: those who think determinism is false and thus free will does exist.
Pessimism: The position that even if determinism is false, free will is still not possible. Argues that if everything is random and uncaused then free will still could not exist in that kind of environment.
Arguments for incompatibilism
Consequence argument: The past is fixed in a way that future does not seem to be. However, determinism means that the conjunction of the fixed past plus the fixed laws of nature entail a fixed future, and since neither the past can be changed nor the laws of nature, then the future is just as fixed as the past. The formal argument:
Alpha: [It is necessary that p] implies that [no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p was true].
Beta: [No one has, or ever had, any choice about whether p was true and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether {p entails q}] implies that [no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether q was true].
(1) It is necessary that [{the past and the laws of nature} entail a unique future] (definition of determinism)
(2) It is necessary that [the past entails that {the laws of nature entail a unique future}] (from logical exportation of 1)
(3) No one has, or ever had, any choice about whether the [the past entails that {the laws of nature entail a unique future}] (from Alpha)
(4) No one has, or ever had, any choice about whether the past is true
(5) No one has, or ever had, any choice about whether [the laws of nature entail a unique future] (from 3, 4, and Beta)
(6) No one has, or ever had, any choice about whether the laws of nature are true
(7) No one has, or ever had, any choice about whether the future is true (from 5, 6, and Beta)
Origination argument: This assumes that free will is when an agent is the originator or "ultimate cause" of a new causal chain, as a "first cause." If that is what free will entails, then it is incompatible with determinism as determinism entails that every event (including actions by agents) are determined by a previous cause. The formal argument:
(1) An agent acts with free will only if she is the originator (or ultimate source) of her actions.
(2) If determinism is true, then everything any agent does is ultimately caused by events and circumstances outside her control.
(3) If everything an agent does is ultimately caused by events and circumstances beyond her control, then the agent is not the originator (or ultimate source) of her actions.
(4) Therefore, if determinism is true, then no agent is the originator (or ultimate source) of her actions.
(5) Therefore, if determinism is true, no agent has free will.
Arguments for compatibilism
Rejection of consequence 1: Argues that free will means that an agent would have had the ability to do otherwise than what they actually did. So if a determinism means that a fixed past and fixed laws of nature entail an agent perform some action, then if the past and the laws of nature were different then they could have performed a different action and thus, free will is preserved.
Rejection of consequence 2: Argues that Beta (see above) is invalid because it leads to false conclusions, such as that [no one has a choice whether {p is true}] and [no one has a choice whether {q is true}] entails that [no one has a choice about whether {p is true and q is true}].
Rejection of origination: Argues that free will does not mean that an agent is the ultimate originator of a new causal chain, i.e. that premise 1 is false. Accepts either a hierarchical model or a reasons-response model of free will. I.e., determinism would not stop someone from having a 2nd order volition (see above), nor would it stop someone having a certain response to certain reasons (see above).
Argument against the ability to do otherwise: If someone only has the ability to do one action (i.e. free will does not exist), but does not know it, then when they perform an action they are still making a moral "choice."
Reactive attitudes: Whether determinism is true or not or conflicts with free will or not should not stop us from having reactive moral attitudes (love, gratitude, etc) in our interpersonal relationships.
The Problem of Universals
Introduction to Universals
Every particular thing has a set of properties. The dog is brown. The apple is red. Rex is a dog. Etc. The subject refers to an individual, but does the predicate refer to something as well? Clearly, it does, but what is it? If one dog is brown, and another dog is brown, does the property “brown” refer to the same single entity? Or are they two individual entities of brown? Or is “brown” even an entity at all? In other words, does the property “brown” refer to something, and if so, what is it like? If not, how do we account for resemblance between the properties of different things?
Versions of Realism
Realism states that universals actually exist, as independently existing entities.
Anti-Realism
States that universals do not exist.
Conclusion
The debate has raged for thousands of years, but today there seems to be a consensus that either strong realism or trope nominalism are true.
Every particular thing has a set of properties. The dog is brown. The apple is red. Rex is a dog. Etc. The subject refers to an individual, but does the predicate refer to something as well? Clearly, it does, but what is it? If one dog is brown, and another dog is brown, does the property “brown” refer to the same single entity? Or are they two individual entities of brown? Or is “brown” even an entity at all? In other words, does the property “brown” refer to something, and if so, what is it like? If not, how do we account for resemblance between the properties of different things?
The Nature of Universals
If universals exist, they would be considerably different from particular things. Particular things are generally considered to be concrete, and extended in space. They also can only be in one place at one time. Universals, however, if they exist, are abstract and not extended. They can also be in many places at once.
Reasons to Postulate Universals
A name refers to something. “Rex” refers to an individual dog. If a property, such as “red’ or “dogness” did not also refer to something, then it would be a useless word. So universals would be the thing that the name refers to.
Also, to gain knowledge you need to be able to know something that is unchanging. Universals would be something that holds over and above any individual thing, thus making knowledge possible.
The Problem of Universals
Our language makes use of general predicates: the stop sign is red, the firetruck is red, etc. The predicate has a one-over-many nature. But is this generality real in nature? Or is it just us?
Versions of Realism
Realism states that universals actually exist, as independently existing entities.
Extreme Realism
Plato had the most famous theory of universals. Universals really exist in a third, ghostly, abstract realm, outside of time and space. Any particular thing “participates” in the Form: a brown dog participates in the Form of dog and the Form of brown. So there is the dog, the brownness, and the Form that grounds that brownness. The Form itself also has its own property. I.e., the Form of brown is itself brown.
Strong Realism
Associated with Aristotle. Universals exist, but they only exist in the things themselves. They do not exist in an abstract, timeless, spaceless realm. But they do have the ability to exist in multiple things at once. This version of realism is immune to one of the more devastating criticisms of extreme realism: the Third Man argument.
Objections to Realism
The Third Man argument: this effects only Plato’s extreme realism. If the Form of red, for example, itself needs to be red, then it too participates in a universal. So there is yet another Form above it. But that too would have to be red, and so on to infinity. We never reach an explanatory stopping point. However, strong realism is immune to this, since it says that universals exist only in the particulars themselves.
Another objection to realism is that we should not admit that something exists if we do not need to posit it: Occam’s Razor. Perhaps we can do without universals. For this, we turn to two varieties of anti-realism: nominalism, and conceptualism.
Anti-Realism
States that universals do not exist.
Predicate Nominalism
This theory says that when we say “Rex is brown”, that’s true of Rex and that’s just the way it is. “Is brown” is just a string of words that can be truly said of Rex, and that’s it. However, this theory basically ignores the whole problem, and so does not solve anything.
Resemblance Nominalism
Properties are explained by putting similar things into sets that resemble each other. So firetrucks, stop signs, and apples all belong to the “red” set. But some things will have multiple properties that will often be paired together: things with a heart and things with a kidney, for example. These things will then be said to be one property, because they are just one set. But clearly they are different properties. Also, sets will overlap. There will be a set with green apples, and that set will also have to include red apples, because they are members of the “apple” set.
But the biggest problem with resemblance nominalism is that it needs to appeal to a universal: resemblance. So it ends up needing universals anyway.
Trope Nominalism
Tropes are universals that have been converted to particulars. On this theory, objects consist of a bundle of properties called tropes. So the brown dog would be a bundle consisting of a brown trope, a dog trope, etc. A bundle of individuals, in other words. No universals necessary. Many of these will look the same, but each one is its own individual. Ones that look the same can be in sets, and can then appeal to resemblance tropes instead of universals, and will therefore avoid the problems with resemblance nominalism.
There are still problems, though. Even though the tropes are individuals, and some of them resemble each other (red tropes, for example), why do they resemble each other? What grounds that? A trope nominalist just says that it’s a brute fact. But it seems that this has not solved the problem at all. The same question just pops up again.
Conceptualism
Holds that universals exist only in our minds.The mind creates, say, “dogness” as an abstract concept. But in trying to account for what grounds these similarities, we are drawn back into data about the real world and back into universals themselves.
Conclusion
The debate has raged for thousands of years, but today there seems to be a consensus that either strong realism or trope nominalism are true.
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